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This new anthology on formal theories of information is based upon research
presented at the May 2006 Muenchenwiler seminar of the Information and
Knowledge research groups of the computer science departments of the universities
of Bern, Fribourg, and Neuchatel. The collection is split into five sections:
Philosophical Reflections; The Syntactical Approach; The Semantical Approach;
Beyond the Semantical Approach; and Philosophical Conclusions. Giovanni
Sommaruga’s introduction is spot on, combining a brief but erudite introduction
to the conceptual motivations underpinning research into formal theories of
information with a thorough summary of the volume’s contributions.
The first section, Philosophical Reflections, consists of Luciano Floridi’s
‘‘Philosophical Conceptions of Information.’’ Floridi’s piece is a good choice for
the opening contribution both for its content and its delivery. He takes the reader on
a clear and accessible journey through every day uses of information, Shannon’s
mathematical theory of communication, Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory of semantic
information, Floridi’s own theory of strongly semantic information, and a range of
philosophical issues.
Accessibility is not achieved at rigour’s expense; Floridi expects some
philosophical acumen on the reader’s part, covering the issues with care. Some
time is taken to ensure that the reader understands that Shannon’s communication
theory is concerned with information measures based on the surprise value of the
signals in question, and not concerned at all with the content carried by such signals.
It was Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s later work on semantic information that outlined an
analysis (both qualitative and quantitative) of informational content. Although, both
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theories are similar at the formal level, their objects of analysis could not be more
distinct.
Floridi covers sub-informational concepts such as data in detail, as well as
applications of informationally-informed philosophical method to notoriously
thorny philosophical issues surrounding truth, hyperintensionality, and mental
representations. Perhaps the best aspect of Floridi’s piece is the balance that it finds
between expositing formal theories of information on the one hand, and
demonstrating applications of such theories to traditional philosophical issues on
the other.
There is also some dangerous philosophical terrain here. Floridi moves quickly
between information itself, which is a commodity, various concepts of information,
various formal analyses of the commodity of information and conceptual analyses
of the concept of information, as well as pragmatist-style reflections on the correct
use of the word ‘information’. Such distinctions are not always marked. Marking
them will reveal still more avenues for research, and Floridi has done a stellar job of
identifying enough of these avenues to keep us busy for some time.
The second section, The Syntactical Approach, consists of two contributions, the
first being Francois Bavaud’s ‘‘Information Theory, Relative Entropy and Statis-
tics.’’ Bavaud’s piece is a demonstration of the conceptual significance of
applications of Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication. The motivating
idea is that we take the two arguments of Shannon’s relative entropy function to
correspond to probability measures of observational data and our expectations. In
this way, Shannon’s relative entropy function is understood as an asymmetric
measure of the dissimilarity between empirical and theoretical probability
distributions; hence relative entropy becomes ‘‘epistemicised’’.
Within this motivating framework, Bavaud covers notions such as hard
falsifications, maximum entropy, factor analysis, alternating minimumisation,
Markov chain models, and the applications of such notions to tasks such as
hypothesis testing (for both single and multiple hypothesis cases), Bayesian
selections, and textual analysis.
The main issue here is one of accessibility. Bavaud’s contribution is the most
demanding entry in the collection by a margin. This is so much the case that it is
unlikely that those without a strong background in statistics will get very far at all.
This is a shame, as the philosophical issues that Bavaud is dealing with are
important.
The second contribution to the second section is Cristian S. Calude’s
‘‘Information: The Algorithmic Paradigm,’’ which focuses on the exposition of
algorithmic information theory and its conceptual implications. Calude has a large
knowledge of other work on formal theories of information (from semantic theories
and logics of information to quantum and ecological information) and situates his
entry in relation to these.
This is probably the clearest account of algorithmic information theory that one
will come across. The sections on the halting problem and data compression in
particular are especially transparent. By far the most fun is had in section four,
which concerns itself with the issue of whether or not computers can create
information. Calude never loses sight of the fact that the issue is being dealt with in
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terms of information in the strict sense delineated by algorithmic information
theory, and he is aware of the connections with the general issue of hyperinten-
sionality as it applies to logical truths and deductions. With computational processes
being canonical examples of deductive structures, it would be interesting to follow
these connections through.
Calude takes us all the way to algorithmic randomness and its connections to
incompleteness and halting, as well as to incompleteness and uncertainty.
Throughout, Calude remains careful of the distinction between formal theories of
information on the one hand, and their objects of analysis on the other.
Section three, The Semantical Approach, consists of four articles, with the first
being Jurg Kohlas and Cesar Schneuwly’s dense but clear ‘‘Information Algebra.’’
The important thing to note is that in this context ‘information algebra’ is a proper
name, not a descriptive one. For example, there is nothing here on Heyting algebras
and constructive logics, nor on Dunn’s work. Instead, Kohlas and Schneuwly
develop a detailed algebraic system based upon the idea that the domains of various
algebraic relations correspond to pieces of information that give partial answers to
the following question: Which of the elements of a Cartesian space represent the
true values of the variables.
Conceptually, Kohlas and Schneuwly have developed their information algebra
in order to model aspects of information processing, rather than identification of
symbols acted on by such processes (as was Shannon’s concern). They develop their
algebra in both labelled and domain-free versions, introduce the operation of
information-transport, and take propositional and predicate logic, as well as various
contexts of informational transfer, as the objects of their analysis.
It is worth emphasising that Kohlas and Schneuwly do all of this with some
pedagogical rigour. For example, section four is as good a demonstration of the
relationship between qualitative and quantitative theories of information as one will
find anywhere (although their terminology and notation departs from common
algebraic usage in places, using ‘‘neutral element’’ for ‘‘unit’’ and so on).
The main issue with Kohlas and Schneuwly’s piece is a philosophical one. They
claim, variously, that their information algebra ‘‘covers important aspects of a
general theory of information’’ (p. 98), or that ‘‘[i]nformation algebras represent a
structure which captures essential features of any concept of ‘information’’’. That
information and the concept of information are distinct things notwithstanding, an
information algebra (in Kohlas and Schneuwly’s sense) possesses properties such as
association, commutation, idempotency, the presence of unit, and so forth, that are
violated by a range of information-processing scenarios (lexical databases and the
resource-sensitive structures captured by variations of Hopf Algebras for just two
examples). Relatedly, under an information algebra analysis, logically equivalent
formulas in propositional logic describe the same information.
The second article in section three is Jurg Kohlas and Christian Eichenberger’s
‘‘Uncertain Information.’’ Their task is to expound algebras of basic probability
assignments, and to then connect these algebras with Bayesian approaches. Kohlas
and Eichenberger explain the notions of decoding and lossy channels from
Shannon’s communication theory in terms of uncertain information. This allows
them to connect the information algebra framework with Shannon’s communication
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theory. Their central operation is a hint, defined as a quadruple consisting of a set of
assumptions, a probability measure on this set, and a function from the set of
assumptions to the power set of parameters. Hints represent the (uncertain)
information drawn from experiment.
Kohlas and Eichenberger spend some time demonstrating the connections
between hypothesis (as uncertain information) and assumptions in propositional
logic. This is done neatly, as is their section five on the connections between
information order and information measure (as was the case in Kohlas’ previous
piece on information algebra). Kohlas and Eichenberger prove that the algebra
corresponding to assumption based inference satisfies all of the axioms of an
information algebra, with the exception of idempotency. This makes perfect sense
from a conceptual standpoint, as the same assumption may need to be made more
than once in experimental settings.
Robert van Rooij’s piece ‘‘Comparing Questions and Answers: A Bit of Logic, a
Bit of Language, and some Bits of Information’’ is the third article in this section.
This entry is getting on a little now, with most of the material having been written in
2000. Since then he has written several follow-up pieces, but the piece here remains
foundational. van Rooij uses the notions of entropy and value-expectation from
Shannon’s communication theory in order to give a quantitative theory of the
goodness of contextualised questions and answers. In short, van Rooij starts with
Groenendijk and Stokhof’s qualitative partitions theory, before moving on to
Shannon’s theory of communication and statistical decision theory. van Rooij’s
exposition of intensional truth-conditional semantics is very careful, and certainly
one of the clearest that one will encounter in the literature. From here we are taken
through several increasingly fine-grained approaches to providing a semantics for
the goodness of answers to questions.
There is an initially appealing idea that a second answer is more informative than
the first if the first answer entails the second, but in this case overinformative
answers (with irrelevant conjuncts) would be preferable to less-informative but
highly relevant answers, which they are not. From here we move to Groenendijk and
Stokhof’s partition theory, from which the basic idea is that the goodness of an
answer may be measured in terms of the partition induced by the question; the more
cells of the partition that a correct answer is incompatible with, the better the
answer. Problems arise here when we incorporate the beliefs of the questioner as
imposing constraints (as they do) on what counts as more or less informative
answers to particular questions.
The expressive limitations of partition theory and its constituent partial orderings
lead van Rooij to move to the total orderings and quantitative framework provided
by Shannon’s theory of communication. Ultimately, he suggests that a game
theoretic framework will be needed in order to account for the full semantic
behaviour of questions and answers. This is more than a little prescient of van Rooij,
as the contemporary game-theoretic research environment attests.
There are some conceptual stumbles in section four, where van Rooij conflates
Shannon’s communication theory with Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory of semantic
information, but anyone familiar with the area (or who has read Floridi’s piece in
the volume) should make it through safely enough.
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The fourth and final contribution to the section on The Semantical Approach is
Jeremy Seligman’s ‘‘Channels: From Logic to Probability.’’ Seligman’s entry takes
at the outset information to be a commodity which reduces uncertainty, and then
takes the reduction of uncertainty to be modelled by both logic and probability
theory. The point of this is to extend the analysis of information-via-logic from the
channel theoretic framework that he developed with Jon Barwise to a probabilistic
approach. This is no easy task, but Seligman brings the reader along with him at
every turn.
Seligman’s theory is dynamic; concerned with modelling information flow rather
than simply individuating information structures. The important difference between
the approaches to information flow via dynamic epistemic logic and that taken via
channel theory, is that the former preserves the use of expressions in a formal
language to express content. The goal of Seligman’s (and Barwise’s) theory, is for
such dynamics to be captured in a way that is independent of any underlying formal
system.
The first task undertaken by Seligman is to expound the channel-theoretic notions
of classifications, infomorphisms, and channels. A classification is essentially a
typing of tokens. An infomorphism is a pair of inverse functions between
classifications. A (binary) channel between two classifications S (source) and
R (receiver) consists of a third classification C, and a pair of infomorphisms such
that one is a pair of inverse functions between C and S, and the other a pair of
inverse functions between C and R. C is called the core of the channel. Seligman
then moves through a channel-theoretic analysis of information structures from the
logic side (Tarski-channels) and probability side (Shannon-channels).
The next channel-theoretic notion Seligman introduces is that of a link. A link is
basically a pair on a classification such that the pair consists of a subset of the tokens
of the classification, and a binary relation between types of the classification such
that if this relation holds, then it is respected by every token in the subset. Seligman
then dedicates section three to assigning links with both logic and probability
theory. Restating Seligman’s ultimate goal in more detail, it is to develop a theory of
links independently of any underlying formal system.
There is a great deal of contrasted conceptual work in Seligman’s final sections,
with connections made to various aspects of category theory, Dretske’s theories of
information flow, and the Barwise-Seligman models of information flow as the
movement of local logics (logics that model parts of the world) around a network of
classifications. This is distinct from the model of information flow in the present
entry, as a relation between types or tokens in the classifications S or R. A technical
appendix covering the details of certain proofs finishes things off.
Seligman’s entry is perhaps the most conceptually adventurous of the collection,
as it is breaking ground that readers are not likely to have encountered elsewhere,
whilst also situating itself within contemporary research on logics of information
flow.
The fourth section of the collection, Beyond the Semantical Approach, consists
of Keith Devlin’s ‘‘Modelling Real Reasoning.’’ Devlin’s entry is an extremely
accessible introduction to the conceptual motivations behind the use of situation
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semantics to model human reasoning in real-world situated scenarios. Devlin
introduces the relevant concepts (of which there are many) with dialectical ease.
Devlin is clear that he is modelling information itself (not the concept of it), and
he notes its status as a commodity. He goes to considerable lengths to lay out the
properties of real-world reasoning (the fact that it is holistic and not always linear
etc.), before deploying situation semantics towards modelling it.
One of Devlin’s central insights, that is as obvious as it is frequently overlooked,
is that humans notice regularities in the world, and that it is this ability to perceive
regularities that allows humans to acquire information about their environment.
Once gotten, such information can be stored and processed and reasoned with in
various ways, and it is this reasoning that Devlin’s framework is designed to model.
The catch here is that Devlin’s theory is not actually a theory of reasoning at all.
Rather, it is a theory of the results of such reasoning procedures. That is, reasoning
is a dynamic procedure, and Devlin’s theory is static.
The final section, Philosophical Conclusions, is made up of Giovanni Somma-
ruga’s ‘‘One or Many Concepts of Information.’’ Sommaruga’s entry on informa-
tional pluralism is both retrospective and speculative in the best way possible. Using
the volume’s contributions as a platform, Sommaruga goes to considerable lengths
in order to indicate their overlapping points of view, as well as their points of
departure. This is quite a task, and Sommaruga accomplishes it with both clarity and
brevity. That Sommaruga argues in favour of an informational pluralism was to be
both expected and welcomed, as such a state of affairs was predicted by Shannon,
for excellent reasons, at the beginning of research into formal information theories
(as articulated in Floridi’s entry to this volume).
Sommaruga’s entry prompts further questions of a foundational nature. For one,
to what extent are formal theories of information itself constrained by results from
the conceptual analysis of the concept of information? A certain lack of constraint
seems likely, as the operational irrelevance of philosophy of mathematics on the
ontological status of numbers has been to much of progress in mathematics
suggests. But the existence of something is not the same thing as the sanction of it,
and such debates are likely to continue for some time.
This is just one of the open questions that Sommaruga’s volume leaves us with,
and there are more. This is both what we should expect and what we should desire.
Formal theories of information and their philosophical analysis are being developed
right now, and this is what makes a volume of this quality so welcome.
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